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N 1940, William A. Vinson,' Sam W. Davis, and Harry W. Freeman
presented a novel legal argument to the Supreme Court of the United
States on behalf of their indigent eighteen-year-old African-Ameri-
can client convicted of rape: Juries and grand juries should accurately re-
flect the demographic makeup of the communities from which they are
chosen. The Supreme Court, unanimously agreed, holding that "juries as
instruments of public justice... [should] be a body truly representative of
the community."'2
More than six decades later, the promise of a "jury of our peers" re-
mains largely unfulfilled in many jurisdictions throughout the country.
Recent data reveals that in two Texas jurisdictions-Dallas and Harris
counties-jury panels or jury venires are not representative of the local
communities. In both jurisdictions, less than one-fifth of the people sum-
moned to jury service ever make it to the courthouse. Among those who
do show up, Latinos,3 young adults, and lower-income hourly wage earn-
ers are significantly underrepresented when compared to their percent-
ages in the general population.
* Robert C. Walters is a trial partner in the Dallas office of Vinson & Elkins L.L.P.
where he serves on the Management Committee. His trial practice includes antitrust and
complex litigation.
Michael D. Marin is a trial partner in the Austin office of Vinson & Elkins, L.L.P. His
trial practice includes both business and tort litigation. He is the President of the Austin
Bar Association, a past-President of the Hispanic Bar Association of Austin, and is in-
volved in numerous other bar and community organizations.
Mark Curriden is a lawyer-media advisor at Vinson & Elkins L.L.P. in Dallas. He serves
on the American Jury Project of the American Bar Association and has written extensively
about the role of juries in American society. He is the author of the bestselling book,
CONTEMPT OF COURT: THE TURN-OF-THE-CENTURY LYNCHING THAT LAUNCHED 100
YEARS OF FEDERALISM (Anchor Books 2001).
The authors would also like to thank Lisa Hobbs, Anthony Miller, Christopher Popov,
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edits.
1. Vinson was a founding partner of Vinson & Elkins, L.L.P., the Houston-based
international law firm.
2. See Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940).
3. The terms "Latino" and "Hispanic" are used interchangeably herein.
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The data revealing the disparities is detailed, consistent, and growing.
The first indication that there was a problem with the jury pools in Texas
came in 2000, when The Dallas Morning News and Southern Methodist
University Law Review did a comprehensive study ("DMN-SMULR
Study") of whom participates in the Dallas County jury process. 4 The
publication, after studying a week of Dallas County jury data, found: (1)
four-of-five people called for jury service do not show up; (2) even
though more than one-in-four Dallas County citizens are Hispanic, only
one-in-fourteen people participating in jury service are Latino; (3) 8% of
prospective jurors are young adults (eighteen to thirty-four year olds),
while 37% of the county's population falls into that category; and (4)
while nearly 40% of the population lives in households earning $35,000 or
less, only 13% of the people participating in jury service do.5
Subsequently, the law firm Vinson & Elkins L.L.P., as part of a pro
bono project, studied the jury venires of more than two dozen criminal
and civil jury trials in Dallas and Harris counties. The law firm's findings
were nearly identical to the DMN-SMULR Study. For example, the V&E
study, which is ongoing, found that Latinos comprise between 7% and
12% of the jury venires in all two-dozen cases, even though Hispanics in
2005 comprise approximately one-third of the populations of Dallas and
Houston. The V&E research, which is now being cited in at least four
active death penalty appeals, shows a similar disparity for young adults.6
So what?
Why does it matter?
Juries are the community's representatives in the American justice sys-
tem. It is the jury that instills public confidence in the court system by
giving the people a voice in the administration of justice. Nearly 70% of
Americans believe that the right to have disputes decided by a jury of
ordinary, randomly selected citizens is the most important element in the
legitimacy of the court system in the United States. 7 Without widespread
public participation in the jury system, public confidence in the system
itself will fail. This endangers the rule of law, and is therefore a grave
threat to the health of our democracy.
The purpose of this article is to (1) bring to the attention of the legal
profession, the judiciary, and the public at large that public participation
in the American jury system is on the decline; (2) examine new data
showing that specific segments of our society are significantly under-
represented in the jury system; (3) analyze the evolution of the law and
4. See The Dallas Morning News & SMU Law Review 2000 Study [hereinafter
"DMN-SMULR Study"] (on file with the SMU Law Review).
5. See Mark Curriden & Allen Pusey, A Poor Reflection: Number of Minority, Lower-
Income Jurors Doesn't Mirror Community, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 22, 2000, at
Al.
6. See Robert Walters & Mark Curriden, A Jury of One's Peers? Investigating Under-
representation in Jury Venires, 43 No. 4 JUDGES J., 17 (2004).
7. American Bar Association poll, And Justice for All: Ensuring Public Trust and
Confidence in the Justice System (2001) (cited in Paula Hannaford-Agor, Increasing the Jury
Pool, National Center for State Courts (August 2004)).
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public policy regarding the need for representative jury pools; (4) study
the current status of legal standards governing the composition of our
jury pools; and (5) identify remedies being implemented to ensure the
constitutional guarantee that all people have the right to a fair trial by an
impartial jury.
A. THE POWER AND ROLE OF THE AMERICAN JURY
No country in the world matches America's embrace of using citizen
panels to judge the guilt of those accused or to settle civil disputes. Every
day, tens-of-thousands of people serve as jurors in courtrooms around the
country. So important is the right to trial by jury that the Founding Fa-
thers guaranteed it in two amendments in the Bill of Rights.8 When it
comes to citizenship, the ability to sit on a jury ranks with freedom of
speech, freedom of religion, and the right to vote. Indeed, one may argue
that jury service is more important than the right to vote.9 After all, vot-
ing is merely a right; jury service is a requirement of citizenship. Ameri-
can juries serve many functions. They are judges of evidence, mediators
of disputes, and the conscience of our communities and political institu-
tions. Juries possess amazing power. They may sentence people to death
or set free someone accused by the state of horrible crimes, bring influen-
tial corporations to their knees through damage awards, or toss out frivo-
lous lawsuits by plaintiffs abusing the legal system. Consequently, the
jury is arguably the purest form of democracy and self-governance. It is
the way the people directly participate in the system of justice. 10 Juries
are asked to weigh the evidence concerning major public policy issues-
ranging from the coverage duties of healthcare maintenance organiza-
tions and the liability of tobacco companies, to the determination of what
8. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein
the crime shall have been committed .... "); and U.S. CONST. amend. VII ("In Suits at
common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial
by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in
any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.").
9. See John Attanasio, Forward: Juries Rule, 54 SMU L. REV. 1681, 1681-83 (2001).
Attanasio is Dean of the Southern Methodist University School of Law and is revered as
one of the premier experts on Constitutional Law in the United States.
"The three most important powers of a citizen are the power to vote, the
power to exercise free speech, and the power to sit on a jury," says At-
tanasio... "The additional, complicating legal issue with jury service is that
while each citizen enjoys a constitutional right to participate in the jury pro-
cess, the parties to a case also possess a constitutional right to have our citi-
zens participate in the jury process."
Walters & Curriden, supra note 6, at 17 (quoting Dean John Attanasio).
10. See Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 300 (1922) ("The jury system postulates a
conscious duty of participation in the machinery of justice .... One of its greatest benefits
is in the security it gives the people that they, as jurors, actual or possible, being part of the
judicial system of the country, can prevent its arbitrary use or abuse.") (quoted in Powers
v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 406 (1991)).
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is obscene material and what is freedom of expression.11 As the Supreme
Court has rightly explained:
Jury service preserves the democratic element of the law, as it guards
the rights of the parties and ensures continued acceptance of the laws
by all of the people .... "It affords ordinary citizens a valuable op-
portunity to participate in a process of government, an experience
fostering, one hopes, a respect for law. Indeed, with the exception of
voting, for most citizens the honor and privilege of jury duty is their
most significant opportunity to participate in the democratic
process."'12
The Sixth Amendment is the people's ultimate check on prosecutorial
power. 13 A group of the accused's fellow citizens must give its unani-
mous approval before any state or federal agent imprisons, fines, or ends
the life of an individual in the United States.
The purpose of a jury is to guard against the exercise of arbitrary
power-to make available the commonsense judgment of the com-
munity as a hedge against the overzealous or mistaken prosecutor
and in preference to the professional or perhaps over-conditioned or
biased response of a judge. This prophylactic vehicle is not provided
if the jury pool is made up of only special segments of the populace
or if large, distinctive groups are excluded from the pool.14
Thomas Jefferson considered "trial by jury ... as the only anchor yet
imagined by man by which government can be held to the principles of its
constitution.' 1 5 Tocqueville wrote in 1835 that he "who punishes the
criminal is therefore the real master of society."' 16
Judge Patrick Higginbotham of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit has argued that the jury is an important political institu-
tion and that the Seventh Amendment's guarantee of the right to trial byjury in civil suits is "a powerful allocator of power and an equally power-
ful expression of the values of representation.' 1 7 United States Chief Jus-
tice William Rehnquist recognized the importance of independent juries
when he wrote that "[tihe founders of our Nation considered the right of
11. See Mark Curriden & Allen Pusey, Deliberate Influence: Juries are increasingly us-
ing verdicts to demand change, make statements, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 25,
2000, at Al.
12. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 407 (1991) (citations omitted) (quoting Duncan v.
Louisiana, 301 U.S. 145, 187 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
13. See id. at 411 (stating that "[t]he jury acts as a vital check against the wrongful
exercise of power by the State and its prosecutors.") (citing Baston v. Kentucky, 476 U.S.
79, 86 (1986)).
14. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975) (citing in part Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 145, 155-156 (1968)).
15. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Paine (July 11, 1789), in 15 Tim PAPERS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 269 (Julian P. Boyd ed., Princeton Univ. Press 1958).
16. ALEXIS DE TOCoUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, 272 (J.P. Mayer ed., George
Lawrence, trans., Harper Perenial 1966) (1835).
17. See Patrick Higginbotham, Foreword, 54 SMU L. REv. 1679, 1680 (2001). Author
Mark Curriden also interviewed Judge Higginbotham at length about the role of juries in
current American society.
[Vol. 58
Jury of Our Peers
trial by jury in civil cases an important bulwark against tyranny and cor-
ruption, a safeguard too precious to be left to the whim of the sovereign,
or, it might be added, to that of the judiciary. 18
II. THE FACTS
In their Petition for Certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United
States in Smith v. Texas,' 9 attorneys Vinson, Davis, and Freeman devel-
oped not only a novel legal theory, but they also presented their argu-
ment in a novel manner: they used statistics.2
0
Smith's lawyers researched ten years of jury and grand jury records and
compared the data with statistics from the 1930-U.S. Census report.
21
They found that while African-Americans comprised more than 20% of
the Harris County population, only 1% of the people called to jury duty
were African-American. 22
In addition, Smith's lawyers argued that only eighteen of the 512 citi-
zens summoned to grand jury service during the entire decade of the thir-
ties were African-Americans, and only five of those eighteen people were
chosen to actually serve on a grand jury.23 By contrast, 379 of the 494
white people called for grand jury duty were selected and served.24 In
fact, the lawyers could identify only one African-American man whom
had even been summoned in 1938 to grand jury service in Harris County,
the year their client was indicted.25
A. V&E JURY PROTECT
In 2003, Vinson & Elkins created a pro bono effort, referred to as the
"V&E Jury Project," designed to examine public participation and diver-
sity in the Texas jury system.26 Following in the footsteps of William Vin-
son and his co-counsel, the V&E Jury Project focuses on data collected
from examining jury venires in more than two dozen individual cases in
Dallas and Harris counties.27 In all, demographic information for more
than 4,000 jurors from the two jurisdictions has been examined and
analyzed.2 8
A compilation of the data reveals that less than 20% of the people
whom are mailed summonses for jury service in Dallas and Harris coun-
18. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 343 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
19. Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940).
20. Id. at 129.
21. Id. at 128-29.
22. See Brief in Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of the




26. V&E Files Historic Constitutional Challenge, Seeks Greater Public Participation





ties ever make it to the courthouse. 29 Of those whom do show up, only
about one-in-nine are Latino, even though Latinos comprise more than
one-in-three of the people living in the two jurisdictions.30 The data also
shows that about 21% of the people participating in jury service are
young adults (eighteen to thirty-four year olds), even though nearly 40%
of the population in the two counties are in that age group. 31
According to Thomas Baker,32 a law professor at Florida International
School of Law in Miami and an expert in U.S. Constitutional Law, "[tihe
mere fact that so many people are not showing up is a big problem."
"The jury is the community's representative in our justice system. If a
representative cross-section means anything, we must have significant
public participation. One out of every five people is not even close to
being representative. '33
As part of the V&E Jury Project, the law firm retained Dr. Harold J.
Hietala34 to review and analyze the data, and to work with counsel in
petitioning courts regarding the issue of representativeness. As of March
1, 2005, he had filed affidavits regarding the statistical representativeness
in five criminal cases in Texas-all on behalf of defendants. 35 In each
case, lawyers for the defendant provided Dr. Hietala with the juror infor-
mation cards that the completed in the five cases. The juror cards in-
cluded the juror's name, maiden name, age, ethnicity, and other personal
information. Dr. Hietala performed a two-prong-statistical analysis to de-
termine the ethnicity of the juror: (1) he calculated the jurors' self-identi-
fication information regarding race; and (2) he examined the names and
maiden names of each juror to see if they are recognized Hispanic names,
as identified by the U.S. Census Bureau and other databases. Dr. Hietala
then determined "minimum" and "maximum" estimates regarding
ethnicity and age, and he compared those estimates to the Census Bureau
data regarding population. Dr. Hietala has testified that he believes the
"minimum" calculation is probably more accurate, but that the "maxi-
mum" calculation gives the state the maximum benefit of the doubt. 36
29. Aff. of Harold J. Hietala, Ex Parte Anthony Dewayne Doyle, Criminal District
Court No. 2, Dallas County, Texas, No. F03-45484.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Walters & Curriden, supra note 6, at 17.
33. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
34. Dr. Harold J. Hietala is Professor Emeritus at the Departments of Anthropology
and Statistical Science at Southern Methodist University in Dallas, Texas. He has a Doctor-
ate in Biostatistics with a minor in Anthropology from the University of California at Los
Angeles, and a Master's Degree in Mathematics from Montana State University.
35. Aff. of Harold J. Hietala, supra note 29.
36. Id. In this affidavit, Dr. Hietela provides cumulative jury data for the various cases
that he has studied, including the following: Texas v. Rayford, Writ Case No. 73,991, Crimi-
nal District Court, Dallas, Texas, No. F00-01529-1H; Texas v. Rivas, Criminal District
Court, Dallas County, Texas, No. F01-00323-T; Texas v. Battaglia, Criminal District Court,Dallas County, Texas, No. F01-52159; Ex Parte Anthony Doyle, Criminal District Court
No. 2, Dallas County, Texas, No. F03-45484; and Texas v. Ronald Prible, 351st District
Court, Harris County, Texas, No. 921126-A.
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1. Texas v. Rayford 37
Rayford is a death penalty case pending in Dallas County.38 Dr.
Hietala was hired in 2002 by defense counsel Lydia Brandt during the
state habeas petition proceedings to examine the juror information cards
for the 683 prospective jurors who appeared for jury service in the case.
Of those, 104 prospective jurors identified themselves as Hispanic.39 In
Dr. Hietala's examination of names, surnames and maiden names, he
identified an additional twenty-four jurors whom might have been La-
tino, even though they did not identify themselves as Hispanic.
40
In a sworn affidavit filed in the matter, Dr. Hietala testified that the
percentage of Hispanics in the Rayford jury venire ranged from a mini-
mum of 7.53% to a possible maximum of 9.66%.41 The 2000 U.S. Census
Bureau calculates that Hispanics comprise 26.37% of the Dallas County
population.42 As a result, the absolute disparity between the percentage
of Hispanics in the population and the percentage of those participating
as jurors in the Rayford case ranged from a minimum of 15.18% to a
maximum of 18.84%. 43
Dr. Hietala also examined the percentage of young adults (eighteen to
thirty-four year olds) among the prospective jurors. He found that
23.11% of the panel fell into that age group, even though 39.81% of Dal-
las County's population is in that age group-an absolute disparity of
16.70% .44
2. Texas v. Rivas45
Rivas is a death penalty case currently on appeal in the state habeas
phase.46 Dr. Hietala was hired in 2003 by defense counsel to examine
demographic information regarding the 540 individuals who appeared for
jury service in the case. He found that a minimum of 8.27% and a maxi-
mum of 10.93% of the prospective jurors were Hispanic, causing an abso-
lute disparity of between 15.24% and 18.40%. 47
Dr. Hietala also found that 20.41% of the jury panel in the Rivas case
were young adults (eighteen to thirty-four), even though 39.81% of Dal-
las County's population is in that age group-an absolute disparity of
19.40% .48
37. Writ Case No. 73,991, Criminal District Court, Dallas, Texas, No. F00-01529-1H.
38. The Rayford case was not originally part of the V&E Jury Project; however, V&E
Jury Project team members have collaborated with defense counsel.






45. Criminal District Court, Dallas County, Texas, No. F01-00323-T.
46. The Rivas case was not originally part of the V&E Jury Project; however, V&E
Jury Project team members have collaborated with defense counsel.




3. Texas v. Battaglia49
Battaglia is a death penalty case on appeal in the state habeas petition
phase. Dr. Hietala was hired as part of the V&E Jury Project to examine
the demographic information of the 480 members of the jury panel who
appeared in the matter. Hispanics, according to his analysis, comprised a
minimum of 8.83% to a maximum of 12.03% of the jury venire, causing a
minimum absolute disparity of 14.87% and a maximum disparity of
17.54%.50
Dr. Hietala also found that 23.75% of the jury venire in the Battaglia
case were young adults (eighteen to thirty-four), even though 39.81% of
Dallas County's population is in that age group-an absolute disparity of
16.06% .51
4. Texas v. Doyle52
Doyle is a death penalty case on appeal in the state habeas stage. Dr.
Hietala was hired as part of the V&E Jury Project to analyze the demo-
graphic information of the 565 prospective jurors who appeared for jury
service in the case. The examination found that Hispanics comprised a
minimum of 7.96% and a maximum of 9.73% of the jury panel, causing
an absolutely disparity of between 16.64% and 18.41%. 53
Dr. Hietala also found that 20.71% of the jury venire in the Doyle case
were young adults, even though 39.81% of Dallas County's population is
in that age group-an absolute disparity of 19.10%. 54
5. Texas v. Prible 55
Prible is a death penalty in the state habeas stage of the appeal. Dr.
Hietala was contracted as part of the V&E Jury Project to examine the
demographic information of the 300 prospective jurors who appeared for
jury duty in the case. He concluded that a minimum of 9.96% and a maxi-
mum of 12.33% of the jurors were Hispanic. 56 Harris County's adult
population is 29.64% Hispanic.57 As a result, the absolute disparity in the
Prible case was between 17.31% and 19.68%.58 Dr. Hietala also reported
that 22.7% of the jury panel was between the ages of eighteen and thirty-
four.59 Harris County's population for that age group is 38.3%, an abso-
lute disparity of 15.6%.60
49. Criminal District Court, Dallas County, Texas, No. F01-52159.
50. See id.
51. See id.
52. Criminal District Court No. 2, Dallas County, Texas, No. F03-45484.
53. See id.
54. See id.
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In addition, there is new data from Harris County that appears to
strongly support the argument that there is an underrepresentation in the
jurisdiction's jury pool. An independent report conducted by the Hous-
ton Chronicle found:
Residents of Harris County's predominantly white, affluent neigh-
borhoods are up to seven times more likely to show up for jury duty
than those in the county's lower-income, mostly minority neighbor-
hoods.. . The low turnout from some pockets of the county skews
the racial, cultural and economic makeup of the jury panels from
which juries are chosen.61 The newspaper also found that only 17%
of Harris County residents respond to their jury summonses. 62
According to the report:
The 10 ZIP codes with the highest turnout, all exceeding 30%, are
predominantly white, with a median annual income of $77,083. The
10 ZIP codes with the lowest turnout, all below 10%, have popula-
tions that are predominantly Hispanic or black. Those areas had a
median income of $29,636. [T]he areas with the lowest jury partici-
pation were Hispanic.63
B. THE DALLAS MORNING NEws-SMU LAW REVIEW STUDY
While many lawyers and judges had suspected for years that their jury
venires were not representative of the community, the evidence support-
ing such a view was thin.64 That changed on October 22, 2000, when The
Dallas Morning News unveiled a series of studies it had conducted with
the SMU Law Review regarding the demographic make-up of the Dallas
County jury pool and jury venires. 65
61. Andrew Tilghman, Turnout Skews Juries' Makeup, HOUSTON CHRON., Mar. 6,
2005, available at http://www.chron.com/CDA/ssistory.npl/topstory/3070514 (last visited
May 26, 2005).
62. Id.
63. Id. Tilghman analyzed data from the Harris County District Clerk's Office, which
revealed that more than 772,000 residents were summoned from more than 140 ZIP Codes
for jury duty in 2004.
64. The statistical evidence required to determine if segments of society are being ex-
cluded is scant. The few studies that have been done are quite recent, have been promoted
very little, and will likely face scrutiny. But these statistical studies are the only measuring
stick available.
65. See DMN-SMULR Study, supra note 4. The DMN-SMULR Study examining the
demographic make-up of Dallas County's jury pool was part of an eighteen-month exami-
nation by the newspaper and the law school. The research resulted in sixteen articles in
The Dallas Morning News and a special issue of the SMU Law Review. Special Issue, 54
SMU L. REV. 1679 (2001). The articles received wide acclaim, winning the prestigious
American Judicature Society's Toni House Award, the American Board of Trial Advocates
Journalism of the Year Award, the Amicus Award given by the Association of Trial Lawyer
of America, and numerous other journalistic and law-related honors. In addition, the au-
thors of the studies have lectured on their findings at state and federal judicial conferences
around the country. The examination of juror demographics was chronicled in detail in
two articles. See Ted Eades, Revisiting the Jury System in Texas: A Study of the Jury Pool in
Dallas County, 54 SMU L. REV. 1813 (2001); Curriden & Pusey, supra note 5, at Al. Mark
Curriden, one of the authors of the instant article, was a leader in the development and
execution of the DMN/SMULR Study.
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The study scrutinized every aspect of jury service in Dallas County dur-
ing the week of March 6, 2000.66 The publications obtained the names,
addresses, and contact information for each of the 13,612 people sum-
moned to serve jury duty that week. These 13,612 people were randomly
chosen by a computer from nearly two million Dallas County residents on
the juror roll. The Secretary of the State of Texas supplies the names of
prospective jurors to Dallas County court officials. The state compiles
the names from two lists: Texas Driver's License and Voter Registration.
According to the survey, the demographic (ethnicity, age and income)
make-up of the 13,612 closely resembled the demographics of Dallas
County, with an average variance of approximately 3%.67 Of the 13,612
people randomly called for jury service, only 2,214-or 17%-showed
up.68 In 1999, Dallas County court officials sent jury notices to more than
650,000 people, but only 19% responded. 69
Dallas and Harris counties are not alone in their struggle of getting
citizens to fulfill their jury service. In Los Angeles, officials say the re-
sponse rate is closer to 11%.70 Tom Munsterman, the director of Jury
Studies at the National Center for State Courts ("NSCS") in Washington,
D.C., says that, "'most states wrestle with equally high no-show rates."' 71
He says "'this very same problem is playing itself out in just about every
major city in this country.' "72
The lack of cross-sectional representativeness in the jury venire is likely
worse in states with large Hispanic populations. Hispanics are the fastest
growing segment of the population in forty-two of the nation's fifty larg-
est cities. 73 But the NCSC reports that the underrepresentation of His-
panics is "bad and getting worse" in most major metropolitan
communities. 74 NCSC officials cite Florida, Georgia, California, and
Texas as facing the biggest problem.75
Specifically, the DMN-SMULR Study found that 6.55% of the people
who appeared for jury service the week of March 6, 2000 were Hispanic. 76
When calculating that Hispanics comprised 26.37% of the adult popula-
66. See Aff. of Allen Pusey, Ex Parte William Earl Rayford, 125 S.W.3d 521 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2005). Part of the DMN-SMULR Study examined the Dallas County jury pool
for the week of March 6, 2000. Researchers, with the assistance of Dallas County court
officials, followed the 13,612. summonses mailed to jurors that week to see what would
happen to each one. The researchers also commissioned a survey, conducted by a profes-
sional polling service, to interview 401 of those who did not respond to the jury summons
and 400 of those who did.






73. See U.S. Census Bureau, 2000.
74. See Curriden & Pusey, supra note 5, at Al.
75. Information obtained from interview with Tom Munsterman by Mark Curriden in
Fall 2004.
76. DMN-SMULR Study, supra note 4.
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tion of Dallas County in 2000, the absolute disparity is 19.82%. 77
The DMN-SMULR study also revealed that young people (eighteen to
thirty-four) were 7.87% of the prospective jurors, even though 39.81% of
Dallas County falls into that age bracket. 78 The absolute disparity is
31.94%.79
But the most revealing part of the DMN-SMULR Study was the find-
ing that while nearly 40% of the adult citizens living in Dallas County
earn less than $35,000 annually, only 13% of prospective jurors from the
week of March 6, 2000 were in that category. 80 By contrast, more than
68% of the people who presented themselves for jury service came from
households earning incomes of $50,000 or more, even though only 42% of
Dallas County earn that much money annually-an actual disparity of
26%.81
The question, of course, is why do more than 80% of the people called
for jury duty not show-up?
The Study found that just slightly more than 3,000 of the 13,612 jury
summons were returned unopened to Dallas County-court officials as un-
deliverable by the U.S. Postal Service. 82 The reason that the summons are
returned, according to the study, is that the people had moved. 83 The
problem is that Texas-like most states-uses the mailing addresses on
people's driver's licenses, which are updated only every four-to-six
years.84 If a citizen moves during that time, but does not inform the
Texas Department of Public Safety, the summons is mailed to an incor-
rect address. 85
This inaccurate mailing list does not affect all groups equally. The
DMN-SMULR Study found that Hispanics, young adults, and low-in-
come adults were disproportionately represented among the 3,000 sum-
monses returned undeliverable. 86 According to social scientists quoted in
the report, one likely reason for this trend is that these demographic
groups are moving up the economic ladder in Texas and therefore tend to
move more frequently as their income allows them to afford nicer places
to live.87
The study also revealed that 1,600 of the people summoned either
claimed an exemption or said that they were disqualified from serving.88
77. See Mark Curriden, A Poor Reflection: Number of Minority, Lower-Income Jurors
Doesn't Mirror Community, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 22, 2000, at Al.




82. DMN-SMULR Study, supra note 4.
83. Id.
84. See Aff. and Test. of Donna Roach, Jury Services Manager, Dallas County, Texas
(July 15, 2002), Ex Parte William Earl Rayford, Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, No.
73,991 (2003).
85. See id.
86. DMN-SMULR Study, supra note 4.
87. See Curriden & Pusey, supra note 5, at Al.
88. DMN-SMULR Study, supra note 4.
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To claim a voluntary exemption, citizens must be in school, have children
at home under the age of ten, or be over the age of sixty-five. 89 The study
found that the citizens who claimed the exemptions were disproportion-
ately Hispanic, young adults, and low-income adults. 90 About 2,100 of
the people who were mailed summonses were notified that they were on
standby status and were not required to report unless contacted by the
court.91 That left roughly 4,600 people who received their jury sum-
monses and were expected to report to the courthouse. 92 The sum-
monses informed potential jurors that they could call the courthouse to
reschedule, though few did. The notice also informed the citizens that
failing to appear for jury service might result in a $1,000 fine. Neverthe-
less, only 2,214 actually appeared for jury duty.93
According to the Study, the low number of non-white people was re-
flected in the fifty-one civil and criminal trials tried in Dallas County the
week of March 6.94 Accounting for the adult population of Dallas
County, a twelve-person jury that exactly reflected the population would
include three Hispanics and at least one black person.95 However, non-
white people did not comprise a majority in any of the fifty-one trials
examined, even though 49% of Dallas County is non-white, and one may
argue that through random selection, at least one of the juries would in-
clude more non-whites than whites.96 By contrast, eight of the juries
were all white.97 Twenty-three of the juries had no Hispanics at all.98
Eighteen juries included only one Hispanic. 99 Only three of the fifty-one
juries had three Hispanics on it. Fifteen of the juries had no African-
Americans.1oo
To find the answer why Hispanics, young adults, and low-income adults
are not showing up for jury service in representative numbers, the DMN-
SMULR Study had surveyed the 401 no-shows and 400 shows. The
89. A person is disqualified to serve as a petit juror unless he: (1) is at least
eighteen years of age; (2) is a citizen of this state and of the county in which
he is to serve as a juror; (3) is qualified under the constitution and laws to
vote in the county in which he is to serve as a juror; (4) is of sound mind and
good moral character; (5) is able to read and write; (6) has not served as a
petit juror for six days during the preceding three months in the county court
or during the preceding six months in the district court; (7) has not been
convicted of a felony; and (8) is not under indictment or other legal accusa-
tion of misdemeanor or felony theft or any other felony.
TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 62.102 (Vernon 1997).
90. DMN-SMULR Study, supra note 4.
91. See TEX. GOV'T CODE Ar. § 61.001(a) (Vernon 1997) (providing that reimburse-
ment of jurors is to be not less the $6 nor more than $50 per day); see also Curriden &
Pusey, supra note 5, at Al.
92. See Curriden, supra note 5, at Al.
93. See id.
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surveys found:10 1
" Twice as many Hispanics as white people found it difficult to take
time off work for jury duty.
" More than 19% of Hispanics and 17% of African-Americans re-
ceived no wages from their employers if they reported to jury ser-
vice. By comparison, only 5% of white people made that claim.
" People earning less than $35,000 annually were twice as likely as
those making more money to have their employers take steps to
discourage them from doing their jury service.
" Forty percent of people who made $35,000 or less had their em-
ployers cut their wages or refuse to pay them during their jury
service. By contrast, only 14% of those earning more than $35,000
had their wages reduced.
* Forty-four percent of the no-shows with annual incomes of less
than $35,000 received no salary at all if they reported to jury duty.
" Nearly 86% of the people who showed up for jury service said
they received their full salary. Only 57% of the no-shows said they
would have received their full wage if they had gone.
The bottom line, according to the Study, was money.'0 2 Texas pays
jurors six dollars per day103-about the cost to park at the downtown
courthouse. The state does not cover the cost of lunch. ° 4 Nor does it
pay the cost of transportation.10 5 Additionally, the state does not require
employers to pay workers while they do their civic duty.
10 6
The most common reason given for why people skipped jury service
was because they could not afford it.107 If they did not go to work, they
would not be paid. If they were not paid, they could not put food on the
table, pay the car bill, or the rent. Unfortunately, these issues dispropor-
tionately impacted Hispanics, young adults, and low-income, hourly-wage
earners.' 0 8 True, there were other significant factors. There were cultural
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. The National Center for State Courts (NCSC) reports that Missouri, New Jersey,
and Texas pay jurors the least $6 a day. Alabama, Arizona, California, Idaho, Illinois, Indi-
ana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, Tennessee, West Virginia, and Wisconsin pay $10-19. Alaska, Arkansas,
Delaware, Maryland, Mississippi, Montana, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Pennsylvania,
and Washington pay $20-25 a day; District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Minne-
sota, Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, Vermont, Virginia, and Wyoming pay $30-35 a
day; New Mexico, New York, South Dakota, and federal courts pay $40 a day; Colorado,
Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Utah pay $50 a day. Jury Management: Juror Pay in the
States, National Center for State Courts, available at http://www.ncsonline.org/wc/Publica-
tions/KIS-JunManPayStates.pdf (last visited May 28, 2005) [hereinafter NCSC Report].
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. The United States Department of Justice reports that six states, as well as the Dis-
trict of Columbia, require employers to pay their employees while they are serving jury
duty: Alabama, Colorado, Georgia, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and New York. State
Court Organization 1998, Bureau of Justice Statistics, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/
bjs/pub/pdf/sco9806.pdf (last visited May 28, 2005).




differences. 109 There were those who simply believed jury service was a
waste of time.110 There were those who reported being so disappointed
in the justice system that they did not want to participate.1 1' But the
bottom line is that the law and how it is applied makes jury duty an oner-
ous task. 12
In addition, Dallas County, like most jurisdictions including Harris
County, employs no enforcement mechanism to encourage people to go
to jury service. 113 As a result, people in the survey said they knew that
there would be no consequence if they simply ignored the jury
summons.114
The DMN-SMULR Study is not alone in its conclusion that juror pay is
the preeminent issue involving public participation. Jury researchers
from NCSC surveyed 34,827 people who participated in jury service in
California state courts in March 2004. They found that 67.1% of the pro-
spective jurors whom were employed did not experience financial hard-
ship as a result of their jury service. 15 By contrast, 67% of those who
were self-employed said that jury duty caused them financial hardship. 116
The survey also found that money was a major issue in longer trials. Only
5% of the prospective jurors who earned less than $25,000 said that their
employer would continue to pay their salary after ten days of jury ser-
vice. 117 By comparison, 39.3% of those earning $65,000 said their em-
ployer would continue to pay them after ten days of serving on a jury.118
According to Paula Hannaford-Agor, a nationally-recognized expert injury studies with NCSC, "[i]n spite of the historical importance and ongo-
ing public support for the jury system, financial hardship-specifically the
loss of income while on jury service-makes it more difficult for a large
segment of the population to participate in the jury system in California
and elsewhere in the United States." 119 She further asserts that
[t]he absence of these individuals has profound implications for the
continued viability and credibility of the jury system. It tends to skew
the resulting composition of the jury pool to the more affluent seg-
ments of society; it distributes the burden of jury service inequitably
on those with the financial wherewithal to serve; and it increases the





113. See Aff. and Test. of Donna Roach, supra note 84.
114. See Curriden & Pusey, supra note 5, at Al.
115. Paula Hannaford-Agor, Increasing the Jury Pool, National Center for State Courts,
August 2004, at 13.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 11.
119. Id. at 1.
120. Id.
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III. THE LAW
A. SMITH V. TEXAS (1940): THE PROMISE OF THE TRULY
REPRESENTATIVE JURY
An all-white Harris County grand jury in 1938 indicted Edgar Smith, a
young African-American man from Houston, Texas, of raping a white
woman. The jury convicted and sentenced him to life in prison. 12 1
Throughout the proceedings, Smith maintained his innocence and testi-
fied that the act of intercourse was at the invitation and with the consent
of the alleged victim.
122
To handle Smith's case, the court appointed Sam W. Davis and Harry
W. Freeman, prominent criminal defense lawyers from Houston. After
losing at trial and at the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, Davis123 and
Freeman obtained the help of William A. Vinson, a prominent corporate
litigator from Houston, for the appeal to the Supreme Court of the
United States.124 On March 18, 1940, Smith's lawyers filed a Petition for
Writ of Certiorari presenting a novel and groundbreaking argument:
Smith's constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment 125 had
been violated because Texas jury selection laws-and specifically the im-
plementation of those laws-systematically excluded African-Americans
from serving on the grand jury that indicted Smith and from participating
in the jury that convicted him. 12 6
Smith's lawyers presented the evidentiary record that no African-
Americans were on the list of citizens from which the grand jury and the
jury were chosen, even though more than 20% of Harris County was Af-
rican-American. 127 The absence of non-white people, they argued, was
not a statistical anomaly but was common place at the Harris County
Courthouse in Houston. 28 Smith's lawyers argued that "Harris County
had arbitrarily and systematically for a period of many years excluded"
African-Americans from jury and grand jury service. 129 "[Tihe discrimi-
nation is covered with a thin veneer of compliance with the law but which
even upon a superficial examination appears inescapably as a scheme to
121. See Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940).
122. See Brief in Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of the
United States, supra note 22.
123. Sam Davis's son, Sam W. Davis, Jr., went on to become a lawyer and a long-time
partner at Vinson & Elkins L.L.P.
124. See Brief in Support of Petition for writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of the
United States, supra note 22. See also HAROLD M. HYMAN, CRAFrSMANSHIP & CHARAc-
TER: A HISTORY OF THE VINSON & ELKINS LAW FIRM OF HOUSTON 1917-1997, 212-213
(University of Georgia Press) (1998).
125. "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
126. See Brief in Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of the






evade the law."' 130 "Is it equal protection when, in nearly ten years, one
percent of the grand juries are composed of Negroes, while more than
twenty percent of the population is of that race!" 13'
[E]qual protection to all is the basic principle upon which justice
under law rests. Indictment by grand jury and trial by jury cease to
harmonize with our traditional concepts of justice at the very mo-
ment particular groups, classes or races-otherwise qualified to serve
as jurors in a community-are excluded as such from jury service. 132
Smith's lawyers argued that jury attendance records in Harris County
"clearly shows a sophisticated evasion of the law rather than an honest
attempt to comply with the law."'1 33 "The [Fourteenth] Amendment nulli-fies sophisticated as well as simple minded modes of discrimination. It hits
onerous procedural requirements which effectively handicap exercise of
the franchise by the colored race although the abstract right to vote may
remain unrestricted as to race.' 34 "Throughout every age and in every
country, minorities-racial, religious, social or political-have been op-
posed or ignored by devious methods, oft times ingenious and sometimes
ridiculous. . . . It is against such unjust practices that the Fourteenth
Amendment stands.' 35
The Texas Attorney General countered that Texas law did not inten-
tionally discriminate based on race. 136 Instead, the Attorney General ar-
gued that African-Americans tended to be excluded from jury service
because they failed to meet non-racial qualifications required under state
law.' 37 The Attorney General argued that Edgar Smith still received a
fair trial by an impartial jury despite the lack of African-Americans on
the grand jury and in the jury venire. 138
Justice Hugo Black, writing for a unanimous Supreme Court, sided
with Smith's lawyers in a precedent-setting decision. With Smith v. Texas,
the Supreme Court forged a new perspective in the evaluation of jury
challenges. Although the Supreme Court acknowledged that the Texasjury scheme was "not in itself unfair; [and that the jury scheme was] capa-
ble of being carried out with no racial discrimination,"' 39 Smith's lawyers
proved to the Court that, despite the facially neutral Texas jury scheme,
the jury officials in Harris County, Texas had intentionally and systemati-
130. See id.
131. Id. at 19.
132. Id. at 20-21 (citing Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354 (1939)).
133. Id. at 21.
134. Id. at 21.
135. Id. at 22.
136. Smith, 311 U.S. at 131.
137. Id. at 132.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 130-131. The Texas "key-man" jury selection scheme, in which jury commis-
sioners personally selected jurors from the community, had the practical effect of excluding
black citizens from jury service. Id.; see also Mitchell S. Zuklie, Rethinking the Fair Cross
Section Requirement, 84 CAL. L. REV. 101, 107 (1996) (using the phrase "key man" when
discussing Smith v. Texas.).
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cally excluded black citizens from jury service. 140 The Supreme Court
reversed Smith's conviction on the ground that enforcing an indictment
returned by such a jury violated the equal protection rights of the defen-
dant.14 1 Justice Black wrote:
It is part of the established tradition in the use of juries as instru-
ments of public justice that the jury be a body truly representative of
the community. For racial discrimination to result in the exclusion
from jury service of otherwise qualified groups not only violates our
Constitution and the laws enacted under it but is at war with our
basic concepts of a democratic society and a representative govern-
ment.... The Fourteenth Amendment requires that equal protec-
tion to all must be given-not merely promised.1
42
B. THE FAIR CROSS-SECrION-FROM SMrrI v. TEXAS TO
THE PRESENT
1. The Early Decisions
Smith v. Texas, which was brought under the Fourteenth Amendment,
was a true landmark case in the advancement of the fair cross-section
requirement, and it became the foundation for the development of mod-
ern fair cross-section analysis. 143 Specifically, as Smith v. Texas estab-
lished, a person is denied his equal protection right to an impartial jury
when the venire from which his jury was chosen is not reflective of a fair
cross-section of the community. Of course, the idea of citizens sitting in
judgment of one another can be found as far back as the drafting of the
Magna Carta. 144 The right to have citizen juries was clearly on the minds
of the Founding Fathers. Thomas Jefferson, in penning the Declaration
of Independence, cited the fact that England had not permitted citizen
juries as one of the reasons for rebellion."'1 45 However, American juries
at that time were anything but a representative cross-section of the com-
munity. The first jury rolls consisted only of property owners, which by
definition meant only wealthy white men.146 While the Sixth Amend-
ment provided for an "impartial jury," the legal interpretation of what
that means has evolved significantly since the Founding Fathers drafted
the amendment in 1791. In the years following Smith v. Texas, the Su-
preme Court periodically expanded and clarified the fair cross-section
doctrine. However, as discussed herein, it was not until the court decided
140. Smith, 311 U.S. at 131.
141. Id. at 132.
142. Id. at 130.
143. See Zuklie, supra note 139, at 107-118 (arguing that the poor should be considered
a "distinctive group" for purposes of fair cross-section analysis). The organization of this
Section follows chronologically the relevant fair cross section cases and statutory develop-
ments presented in Zuklie's excellent summary. See id.; see also Eades, supra note 65, at
1820-21.
144. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 151 (1968).
145. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 20 (U.S. 1776).




Taylor v. Louisiana in 1975 that the Court formally recognized the princi-
ple that inherent to the impartial jury of the Sixth Amendment is the
right to have juries selected from a representative cross section.147
In Glasser v. United States, a 1942 case, the Supreme Court, in its first
post-Smith v. Texas fair cross-section decision, further expanded the fair
cross-section requirement by ruling against the requirement that jurors be
selected from a particular private organization. 148 Glasser and two other
defendants had alleged that "they were denied an impartial trial" in viola-
tion of the Sixth Amendment because the jury panel excluded "all wo-
men not members of the Illinois League of Women Voters. ' 149 The
Supreme Court stated that notions "of what a proper jury is have devel-
oped in harmony with our basic concepts of a democratic society and a
representative government."o50  The Supreme Court noted that
"[t]endencies, no matter how slight, toward the selection of jurors by any
method other than a process which will insure a trial by a representative
group are undermining processes weakening the institution of jury trial,
and should be sturdily resisted. ' 151 Citing Smith v. Texas, the Court held
that for the jury to be a "body truly representative of the community," 152
it must reflect a "cross-section of the community. '153 The Court further
held that "[tihe deliberate selection of jurors from the membership of
particular private organizations" violates the fair cross-section
requirement. 54
In Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., a 1946 case, the Supreme Court ex-
tended the fair cross-section requirement by ruling that jury officials
might not intentionally exclude "daily wage earners" from federal jury
service. 155 Declaring that "those eligible for jury service are to be found
in every stratum of society," the Supreme Court held that discrimination
against potential jurors on the basis of economic status was "abhorrent to
the democratic ideals of trial by jury."'1 56 The Court stated "[tihe Ameri-
can tradition of trial by jury ... necessarily contemplates an impartial jury
drawn from a cross-section of the community," and requires that court
officials must select prospective jurors without systematically and inten-
tionally excluding any of the economic, social, religious, racial, political,
and geographical groups of the community' 57
In Hernandez v. Texas, a 1954 case, the Supreme Court recognized
Mexican-Americans as a distinct group whose exclusion from jury service
147. 419 U.S. 522, 526-30 (1975).
148. 315 U.S. 60, 85-86 (1942).
149. Id. at 83-84.
150. Id. at 85.
151. Id. at 86.
152. Id. at 85 (citing Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1946)).
153. Id. at 86.
154. Id.
155. 328 U.S. 217, 224 (1946). The underlying dispute was a civil claim removed to
federal court under diversity jurisdiction. Id. at 219.
156. Id. at 220.
157. Id.
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violates the Fourteenth Amendment.1 58 As in Smith v. Texas, the Court
noted that "the Texas system of selecting grand and petit jurors by the use
of jury commissions is fair on its face and capable of being utilized with-
out discrimination. ' 159 In reversing the conviction, however, the Su-
preme Court found the exclusion of Mexican-Americans from jury
service to be unconstitutional because the statistics showed that for
twenty-five years not a single Mexican-American had served on a jury in
a county where 14% of the population were of Mexican-American
descent.160
2. The Jury Selection and Service Act
In 1968, Congress reformed the federal jury system and enacted the
Jury Selection and Service Act ("JSSA"). 16 1 The JSSA provides that,
"[i]t is the policy of the United States that all litigants in Federal courts
entitled to trial by jury shall have the right to grand and petit juries se-
lected at random from a fair cross section of the community in the district
or division wherein the court convenes.' 62 The JSSA further provides
that "[n]o citizen shall be excluded from [jury service in the Federal
courts] on account of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or eco-
nomic status."'1 63 Under the JSSA, Congress "established the machinery
by which the stated policy was to be implemented.'1 64 That machinery
was designed to "ensure the random selection of a fair cross section of the
persons residing in the community."'1 65 In passing the JSSA, the congres-
sional committees recognized the "political function" of the jury in the
administration of law and that "the requirement of a jury's being chosen
from a fair cross section of the community is fundamental to the Ameri-
can system of justice."'166
3. Taylor v. Louisiana
In Taylor v. Louisiana, a 1975 case, the Supreme Court, while weighing
a challenge to Louisiana's "opt-in" jury selection system, referenced the
watershed significance of Smith v. Texas and declared:
The unmistakable import of [the Supreme Court's] opinions, at least
since 1940, Smith v. Texas, supra, and not repudiated by intervening
decisions, is that the selection of a petit jury from a representative
cross section of the community is an essential component of the Sixth
158. 347 U.S. 475, 481-82 (1954) (holding unconstitutional the exclusion of Mexican-
Americans from jury service).
159. Id. at 478-79.
160. Id. at 481-82.
161. Pub. L. No. 90-274, 82 Stat. 53 (1968) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-
1869 (2000)); see also Zuklie, supra note 139, at 110-111 (citations omitted).
162. 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (2000) (emphasis added).
163. 28 U.S.C. § 1862 (2000).
164. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 529 (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1862-1866).
165. 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(3) (2000).
166. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 529-530 (citing H.R. 1076, 90th Cong. (2d Sess.1968) and S. 891,
90th Cong. (1st Sess. 1967)); see also Zuklie, supra note 139, at 110.
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Amendment right to a jury trial. 167
In Taylor, the Court was evaluating the Louisiana's "opt-in" jury selec-
tion process that automatically included men on the master jury list but
included women only if they registered with local jury officials.168 Al-
though women were 53% of those eligible for jury service, they were only
10% of the jury wheel. 169 Noting that while Louisiana's "opt-in" system
did not disqualify women from jury service, the systematic impact on the
system was "that only a very few women ... [were] called for jury ser-
vice.' 70 And, for the first time, the Supreme Court held "that the exclu-
sion of women from jury venires deprives a criminal defendant of his
Sixth Amendment right to trial by an impartial jury drawn from a fair
cross section of the community.' 71 While expanding the fair cross-sec-
tion requirement to ban systematic exclusion of women from participat-
ing in the jury system, the Supreme Court stated: "Defendants are not
entitled to a jury of any particular composition .... but the jury wheels,
pools of names, panels, or venires from which juries are drawn must not
systematically exclude distinctive groups in the community and thereby
fail to be reasonably representative thereof.' 72 Thus, in Taylor, the Su-
preme Court formally stated what it had promised in Smith v Texas-that
a grand or petit jury must be drawn from "a representative cross-section
of the community" to satisfy the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of trial by
an impartial jury.173
4. Duren v. Missouri
In Duren v. Missouri, a 1979 case, the Supreme Court began to clarify
"systematic exclusion," "distinctive groups," and it set forth the prima-
facie case for a fair cross-section challenge. 174 In Duren, Missouri's jury-
selection procedure granted women an automatic exemption from jury
service if they so requested. 175 Although women were 54% of those eligi-
ble for jury service, they were less than 27% of those summoned for jury
service and approximately 15% of those present on venires.176 In re-
sponse to Durens's challenge that these statistics demonstrated a viola-
tion of the fair cross-section requirement, the Supreme Court announced
167. 419 U.S. at 528; see also, Zuklie, supra note 139, at 107 n.52.
168. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 525-26. The Court was evaluating Louisiana's "opt-in" jury-
selection system after its holding in Duncan, that the Sixth Amendment's provision for jury
trial is made binding on the States by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 527.
169. Id. at 525-526.
170. Id. at 525.
171. Id. at 535-536.
172. Id. at 538 (citations omitted); see also Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 409 (1991)("An individual juror does not have a right to sit on any particular petit jury, but he or she
does possess the right not to be excluded from one on account of race.").
173. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 527-28.
174. 439 U.S. 357, 360-68 (1979).
175. Id. at 360.
176. Id. at 362.
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a three-prong test to make a prima facie showing that the composition of
the jury wheel does not represent a fair cross-section of the community:
(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a 'distinctive' group in
the community;
(2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries
are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number
of such persons in the community; and
(3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of
the group in the jury-selection process. 177
Because Duren met the first two prongs of the test, the critical issue
was whether he had shown "that the underrepresentation of women, gen-
erally and on his venire, was due to their systematic exclusion in the jury-
selection process."'1 78 The Court stated that underrepresentation is "sys-
tematic" if it is "inherent in the particular jury-selection process uti-
lized. ' 179 Because "a large discrepancy" between the number of women
eligible for jury service and the number of women impaneled on the ve-
nire "occurred not just occasionally, but in every weekly venire for a pe-
riod of nearly a year," the Court held that there was systematic
exclusion. 180
C. FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT CLAIMS
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides a
second means for challenging the constitutionality of a jury selection pro-
cess.' 8' Whereas the Sixth Amendment guarantees every criminal defen-
dant the right to a jury selected from a fair cross-section of the
community, the Equal Protection clause prohibits states from excluding
jurors on the basis of race or membership in some other protected
class.' 82 In Strauder v. West Virginia, a 1880 case, the Supreme Court for
177. Id. at 364.
178. Id. at 364-66 (emphasis added).
179. Id. at 366.
180. Id. Although "large discrepancy" is not defined, the second prong of the Duren
test requires a petitioner to prove that the representation of a group "is not fair and rea-
sonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community." Id. at 364. How-
ever, the Duren test provides no standards for defining what "fair and reasonable" means.
See Peter A. Detre, A Proposal for Measuring Underrepresentation in the Composition of
the Jury Wheel, 103 YALE L.J. 1913, 1927-30 (1994) (discussing the competing methodolo-
gies for measuring underrepresentation).
181. In addition to the Sixth Amendment and the JSSA, a petitioner may base a chal-
lenge as to the composition of the jury wheel on the Equal Protection Clause or on the
Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. See Detre, supra note 180,
at 1914.
182. "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." U.S. CONST. amend. 14, § 1. Notably, forty-nine state constitutions-with the ex-
ception of Colorado-contain language nearly identical to the Sixth and Seventh Amend-
ments regarding rights to a "fair trial" and to an "impartial jury." For example, Article I,
Section 15, and Article V, Section 10, of the Texas Constitution guarantee the right to a
jury trial, except in certain limited circumstances. State v. Credit Bureau of Laredo, Inc.,
530 S.W.2d 288, 291-92 (Tex. 1975).
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the first time found an equal protection violation in the jury selection
context. 183 In Strauder, the Court held that the state had denied equal
protection under the law to an African-American criminal defendant be-
cause he was tried by a jury that, by state law, explicitly excluded all Afri-
can-Americans. 184 The Court has since expanded the clause to prohibit
jury selection practices that on their face are race neutral but have the
effect of disproportionately excluding certain protected classes.
In 1977, in Castaneda v. Partida, the Supreme Court issued the seminal
equal protection case involving statistical disparity (rather than absolute
exclusion), laying out the mechanics of an equal-protection claim, which
are similar to the those of a fair cross section claim. 185 To state a prima-
facie case of discrimination, the claimant must do three things: (1) prove
that the group at issue "is a recognizable, distinct class, singled out for
different treatment under the laws, as written or as applied;" (2) prove
that there is substantial underrepresentation of that group in the jury
pool "by comparing the proportion of the group in the total population to
the proportion called to serve as jurors over a significant period of time;"
(3) prove that the selection procedure is susceptible of abuse or is not
racially neutral will further support the presumption of discrimination
raised by the statistical showing.186 Unlike the Sixth Amendment claim,
an equal protection petitioner must prove intentional discrimination and
that the alleged underrepresentation occurred over a period of time. 187
The criminal defendant in Castaneda demonstrated that over an
eleven-year period, only 39% of the jurors summoned in Hidalgo County,
Texas were Hispanic, while over 79% of its population was Hispanic.188
Although the county's jury selection procedure did not discriminate
against Hispanics on its face, it gave the county's jury commissioner the
discretion to exclude individual jurors based on highly subjective (and
potentially nefarious) criteria.189 The Court held that in light of the sta-
tistical evidence, the subjective method of selection, and the state's fail-
ure to offer a competent rebuttal, the defendant had established an equal
protection violation as a matter of law.190
Once the defendant establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, the
183. 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
184. Id. at 309. The Civil Rights Act of 1875 "made it a criminal offense to exclude
persons from jury service on account of their race. In a trilogy of cases decided soon after
enactment of this prohibition, [the Supreme] Court confirmed the validity of the statute, as
well as the broader constitutional imperative of race neutrality in jury selection." Powers
v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 402 (1991) (citing Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1880)
; Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 321 (1880); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880)) (cita-
tions omitted).
185. 430 U.S. 482 (1977).
186. See id. at 493-94.
187. Eades, supra note 65, at 1821 (citing Timmell v. Phillips, 799 F.2d 1083, 1083 n.1
(5th Cir. 1986)).
188. 430 U.S. at 495-96.
189. Id. at 497-99.
190. Id. at 500-01.
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burden shifts to the government to rebut that presumption.191 The gov-
ernment may rebut this presumption by presenting evidence that it had
no discriminatory purpose in its selection process or that its process did
not have a determinative effect on the jury wheel. 192
Courts have also applied different methods for calculating the statisti-
cal underrepresentation of a given group depending on whether the pro-
cess is challenged on equal protection or fair cross-section grounds.' 93 As
one might expect, there are several ways to calculate the percentage by
which a jury selection process underrepresents a certain group of peo-
ple. 194 The most common method used in both equal protection and fair
cross-section claims is the "absolute disparity" method.195 To calculate
the absolute disparity between a group's presence in the general popula-
tion and its presence on the jury wheel, courts simply subtract the latter
percentage from the former.196 Thus, if a group represents 80% of the
county's population but accounts for only 40% of the jury wheel, the ab-
solute disparity is forty percentage points., But although its simplicity
makes it attractive, the absolute disparity does not always give an accu-
rate picture of the potential problem, especially if the general population
of the group is relatively low. 197
As a result, some courts have begun to use a second, more sophisti-
cated measure of proportional disparity called "statistical decision the-
ory" (SDT) to establish equal protection violations.1 98 SDT is calculated
using binomial distribution to determine the probability that a group's
underrepresentation on the jury wheel was the result of chance. 199 This
metric is intuitively appropriate in equal protection cases in which the
stated objective is to prove intentional discrimination. Furthermore,
since the focus of an SDT calculation is on the likelihood that the dispar-
ity is the result of chance and not on the sheer size of the disparity, this
calculation may provide a strategic advantage for a claimant attempting
to establish the under-representation of a relatively small minority.20°
For instance, if Native Americans constitute 4% of the general popula-
tion of a given county but only 1% of the people selected for the jury
wheel are Native Americans, the absolute disparity is only 3%. Thus, a
claimant may have a difficult time establishing an unfair cross-section de-
fense. If, however, a claimant shows that it is highly unlikely that this 3%
191. Id. at 495.
192. See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 370-71 n.26 (1979) (discussing the difference
between rebutting a presumption in an equal-protection case and one involving a fair-
cross-section claim).
193. See Eades, supra note 65, at 1822-23; Detre, supra note 180, at 1917-18.
194. See Eades, supra note 65, at 1822-23; Detre, supra note 180, at 1917-18.
195. See Detre, supra note 180, at 1923.
196. Id. at 1917.
197. See Eades, supra note 65, at 1822-23; Detre, supra note 180, at 1917-18.
198. See Eades, supra note 65, at 1823; Detre, supra note 180, at 1918.
199. See Eades, supra note 65, at 1823; Detre, supra note 180, at 1918.
200. See Eades, supra note 65, at 1823; Detre, supra note 180, at 1918.
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disparity is the result of chance, the claimant may have a better chance of
asserting an equal protection claim.
Some commentators have stated that the Sixth Amendment is a more
effective means of challenging a jury selection process because, unlike an
equal protection claim, it does not require evidence of intentional dis-
crimination. 201 While it is true that an equal protection claim requires a
showing of intentional discrimination, the effect of this difference should
not be overstated. The burden shifting analysis of an equal protection
claim is in practice quite similar to the burden shifting analysis for a fair
cross-section claim. Because defendants rarely have direct evidence of
intentional discrimination, the most common means of stating an equal
protection violation is by demonstrating disparate impact through statisti-
cal evidence.202 Upon a showing of disparate impact, once the defendant
has stated a prima-facie case of discrimination, the burden shifts to the
state to show that it did not act with discriminatory intent or that its ac-
tions did not have a determinative effect on the jury pool.20 3 As Justice
Rehnquist observed in his dissenting opinion in Duren, there is little prac-
tical difference between a showing that the state acted without discrimi-
natory intent and a showing that it acted with "adequate justification. ' 20 4
In some ways, the Equal Protection Clause may give claimants more
flexibility in challenging jury selection procedures that cause the under-
representation of certain groups. Unlike a fair cross-section claim, which
only criminal defendants have standing to assert, 20 5 equal protection
claims may be asserted either by a defendant, an excluded juror, or a class
of persons systemically excluded from the jury wheel.2°6 As at least one
commentator has noted, that from a strategic standpoint, a class of poten-
tial jurors requesting prospective relief may have better luck presenting
the issue to the court than a criminal defendant who is requesting reversal
of his conviction.20 7
In 1986, in Batson v. Kentucky, the Supreme Court ruled that the Four-
teenth Amendment prohibits lawyers in criminal and civil cases from us-
ing their peremptory strikes to remove people from serving on juries
201. See Eades, supra note 65, at 1821; Detre, supra note 180, at 1916; see also, Zuklie,
supra note 139, at 132-133.
202. See, e.g., Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 (1977).
203. Id. at 495.
204. Duren, 439 U.S. at 370-71 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (proclaiming the difference
between the state's burden to prove a "adequate justification" to rebut a Sixth Amend-
ment claim and its burden to prove the "absence of intent to discriminate" to rebut an
equal protection claim to be a mere "fiction").
205. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (entitling the "accused" in a criminal case to "the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury") (emphasis added); see also United States v.
King, 36 F. Supp. 2d 705, 710 n.3 (E.D. Va. 1999) (explaining that Sixth Amendment rights
are "personal to the defendant, and [do] not support a third-party standing analysis.").
206. Carter v. Jury Comm'n of Greene County, 396 U.S. 320, 329 (1970); Berry v.
Cooper, 577 F.2d 322, 324 (5th Cir. 1978). At least one commentator has argued that race-
based jury selection injures only the excluded juror. See Barbara D. Underwood, Ending
Race Discrimination in Jury Selection: Whose Right Is It, Anyway?, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 725,
726-27 (1992).
207. See Underwood, supra note 206, at 744.
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because of race, ethnicity and gender. 208 The Supreme Court ruled that
jurors (as opposed to defendants) have a right to not be discriminated
against based on race.209 The question here is how state laws being im-
plemented regarding the jury system systematically encourage or dis-
suade certain groups of individuals (e.g., Hispanics, young adults and low-
income adults) from participating in jury service. May such a claim be
brought and by whom-a juror, a class of jurors, a criminal defendant, of
a civil plaintiff or defendant?
IV. A PRESSING CONCERN OF THE AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION
Jury pools not being as representative of the community as they should
be clearly concerns the nation's leading legal organization. On February
14, 2005, the American Bar Association implemented new model stan-
dards for jury service.210 The issue of diversity and representativeness is
such a concern for the ABA that four of the nineteen principles address
it.211
" Principle 2, Section B reads: "Eligibility for jury service should not
be denied or limited on the basis of race, national origin, gender,
age, religious belief, income, occupation, disability, sexual orienta-
tion, or any other factor that discriminates against a cognizable
group in the jurisdiction .... ,,212
" Principle 5, Section B states that, "[ciourts should collect and ana-
lyze information regarding the performance of the jury system on
a regular basis in order to ensure: (1) The representativeness and
inclusiveness of the jury source list; (2) The responsiveness of indi-
vidual citizens to jury duty summonses." 213
* Principle 10, Section A states:
Juror source pools should be assembled so as to assure representa-
tiveness and inclusiveness. (1) The names of potential jurors
should be drawn from a jury source list compiled from two or
more regularly maintained lists of persons residing in the jurisdic-
tion. These source lists should be updated at least annually. (2)
The jury source list and the assembled pool should be representa-
tive and inclusive of the eligible population in the jurisdiction. The
source list and the assembled jury pool are representative of the
population to the extent the percentages of cognizable group
members on the source list and in the assembled jury pool are rea-
sonably proportionate to the corresponding percentages in the
208. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986).
209. Id. at 87; see also JSSA, supra note 162; see Eades, supra note 65, at 1819-20 (citing
Berry v. Cooper, 577 F.2d 322, 324 (5th Cir. 1978)).
210. Principles for Juries and Jury Trials, American Bar Association, available at http://
abanet.org/juryprojectstandards/principles.pdf (last visited May 28, 2005).
211. Id.
212. See id.
213. See id. A principal reason that the V&E Jury Project is data intensive is the fact
that courts and clerks are not required to maintain the relevant data to measure the repre-
sentativeness of jury pools.
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population. (3) The court should periodically review the jury
source list and the assembled pool for their representativeness and
inclusiveness of the eligible population in the jurisdiction. (4)
Should the court determine that improvement is needed in the
representativeness or inclusiveness of the jury source list or the
assembled jury pool, appropriate corrective action should be
taken.2 14
Principle 10, Section E states: "Opportunity to challenge the as-
sembled jury pool should be afforded all parties on the ground
that there has been material departure from the requirements of
the law governing selection of jurors. The court should maintain
demographic information as to its source lists, summonses issued,
and reporting jurors. '2 15
Robert Grey, President of the American Bar Association, stated that
the implementation of these jury principles is essential to the future of
the American jury system.
As our nation continues to grow and diversify, we must work hard to
guarantee that every group, every part of our community, indeed
every person participates in the jury process. The American justice
system will not survive if we do not make the jury process accessible
to every citizen. The participation of every member of our society is
necessary if the jury system, which is the backbone of our justice
system, is to remain strong.2 16
V. FRAMEWORK OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE
Now, six decades after the historic argument of Smith v. Texas before
the Supreme Court, the promise of the representative jury continues to
be as questioned as unfulfilled. 217 The well-documented diversification of
America continues, yet the constitutional requirement that jury venires
be "truly representative" of the demographics of our local communities
continues to evade many courthouses across the United States and ap-
pears to be increasingly difficult to achieve. State jury laws and how they
are implemented are being challenged on the grounds that juries are still
not a "representative cross-section of the community."2 18 Using Texas v.
Rayford2 19 as a model, the argument frame work presented by the V&E
Jury Project is presented below.
214. See id.
215. See id.
216. American Bar Association President Robert Gray, Speech at Georgetown Law
Center's Black Law Students Association's Annual Alumni Association Program (Feb. 26,
2005).
217. See 311 U.S. 128 (1940).
218. See Taylor, 419 U.S. at 528.
219. See Writ Case No. 73,991, Criminal District Court, Dallas, Texas, No. FOO-01529-
1H.
[Vol. 58
Jury of Our Peers
A. STEP ONE: APPLICANT WAS DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
TO AN IMPARTIAL JURY BECAUSE THE VENIRE DID NOT REFLECT A
FAIR CROSS-SECTION OF THE COMMUNITY.
In 1975, the United States Supreme Court in Taylor v. Louisiana held:
"[T]he jury wheels, pools of names, panels, or venires from which juries
are drawn must not systematically exclude distinctive groups in the com-
munity and thereby fail to be reasonably representative thereof. '220 Be-
cause Dallas County systematically excludes Hispanics from jury service,
Rayford was denied his right to a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of
the community as guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth amendments.
As explained below, each of the elements required to establish a prima-
facie violation of the fair cross-section requirement is satisfied. In
particular:
* Hispanics qualify as a distinctive group.22 1
* Hispanics are underrepresented on the venire as a matter of law.
Based on his analysis of the data, Dr. Hietala determined that
Hispanics were in fact significantly underrepresented. 2 22 Hispan-
ics make up 26.4% of persons in the county eligible for jury ser-
vice, but Rayford's venire panel included between fifty and sixty-
six Hispanics out of 683 prospective jurors, a range of 7.53% to a
maximum 9.66%.223 Rayford's twelve person jury contained zero
Hispanics.
The exclusion of Hispanics from venire panels is systematic in
that it is the direct result of procedures adopted by the State of
Texas and implemented by court officials. As shown below, His-
panics are being excluded primarily because the pay for jury ser-
vice (six dollars a day) is the lowest in the nation.2 24
B. STEP Two: APPLICANT HAS AN ABSOLUTE RIGHT TO A JURY
DRAWN FROM A FAIR CROSS-SECTION OF THE COMMUNITY
The right to a fair and impartial jury in criminal cases is one of the most
fundamental aspects of the government and society of the United
States.225 "Jury service preserves the democratic element of the law...
220. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 538.
221. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S.
482, 495 (1977); Aldrich v. State, 928 S.W.2d 558, 560 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) ("We accept
that Hispanics are a distinctive group in any community..."). Although young people
have been held not to qualify as a distinctive group, Dr. Hietala also analyzed the jury
venire data from this case to determine whether young people (persons aged 28-34) were
underrepresented. The data show an absolute disparity ranging from 16.06% to 17.06%.
See Aff. of Professor Harold Hietala, Ph.D., supra note 29. Professor Hietala also analyzed
the data from two other cases, as well as the DMN-SMULR Study. See id. Together, the
data show an absolute disparity ranging from 16.70% to 31.94%. Id. These numbers are
much higher than would be necessary to show systematic underrepresentation in violation
of the Sixth Amendment. See United States v. Maskeny, 609 F.2d 183, 189 (5th Cir. 1980).
222. Aff. of Harold J. Hietala, supra note 29.
223. Id.
224. See NCSC Report, supra note 103.
225. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 407 (1991).
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[because it] affords ordinary citizens a valuable opportunity to participate
in a process of government, an experience fostering, one hopes, a respect
for the law."' 226 Jury service also "guard[s] against the exercise of arbi-
trary power... [by making] available the commonsense judgment of the
community as a hedge against the overzealous or mistaken prosecutor
and in preference to the professional or perhaps overconditioned or bi-
ased response of a judge. ' 227 Accordingly, the right to an impartial jury,
which traces its roots back to the signing of Magna Carta in the thirteenth
century,228 is preserved by the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution.229
"The very idea of a jury is a body of men composed of the peers or
equals of the person whose rights it is selected or summoned to deter-
mine; that is, of his neighbors, fellows, associates, persons having the
same legal status as that which he holds. '230 Thus, "[t]he American tradi-
tion of trial by jury ... necessarily contemplates an impartial jury drawn
from a cross-section of the community" and requires that "prospective
jurors shall be selected by court officials without systematic and inten-
tional exclusion of any of [the economic, social, religious, racial, political
and geographical] groups. ' '231
The tool provided to ensure this requirement is met is the fair cross-
section claim, articulated by the Supreme Court in Duren v. Missouri.232
To prove a violation of Rayford's right to a jury drawn from a fair cross
section of the community, an individual must show:
(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a "distinctive" group in
the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires
from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation
to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this
under-representation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in
the jury-selection process. 233
Once the defendant makes a prima-facie showing of a fair cross-section
violation, the burden shifts to the state to show "that the disproportionate
exclusion manifestly and primarily advances a significant governmental
interest. "234
Fair cross-section claims are not limited to federal courts.235 Rather,
226. Id. (internal quotation omitted).
227. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975).
228. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155-56 (1968).
229. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed." U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
230. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 536 n.19 (quoting Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308
(1879)).
231. Thiel v. U.S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946).
232. 439 U.S. at 364.
233. Id.
234. Aldrich v. State, 928 S.W.2d 558, 560 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (quoting Duren, 439
U.S. at 367-68); see also United States v. Maskeny, 609 F.2d 183, 189 (5th Cir. 1980) ("un-
less the state shows that the aspects of the process that result in the disproportion mani-
festly and primarily advance a significant state interest.").
235. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148 (1968).
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the requirement applies to state court criminal proceedings by virtue of
the Fourteenth Amendment. 236 Nor is membership in the excluded class
a requisite for raising a claim.237 Finally, the requirement is not a guaran-
tee of "a jury of any particular composition. '2 38 Instead, the right to
bring a fair cross-section claim ensures only that venires from which juries
are drawn do not systematically exclude distinctive groups in the
community.2 39
C. STEP THREE: HISPANICS ARE A DISTINCTIVE GROUP UNDER THE
DUREN TEST.
Hispanics have repeatedly been held to be a distinctive group.240 The
Supreme Court has never defined "distinctiveness" but has held that "the
concept ... must be linked to the purposes of the fair cross-section re-
quirement. '241 The "purposes" were identified by the court as:
(1) 'guarding against the exercise of arbitrary power' and ensuring
that the 'commonsense judgment of the community' will act as 'a
hedge against the overzealous or mistaken prosecutor,' (2) preserv-
ing 'public confidence in the fairness of the criminal justice system,'
and (3) implementing our belief that 'sharing in the administration of
justice is a phase of civic responsibility.' 242
In Weaver v. State, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that distinctiveness is
found where a "common thread of shared experience or political, social,
or religious viewpoint binds this group together.
243
D. STEP FOUR: THE UNDER-REPRESENTATION OF HISPANICS ON
DALLAS COUNTY VENIRES IS BOTH UNFAIR
AND UNREASONABLE
The second element of the Duren test requires that Rayford show "that
the representation of [Hispanics] in venires from which juries are selected
is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the
community. ' 244 To meet this requirement, a defendant should present
236. Id.
237. Duren, 439 U.S. at 359 n.1 (citing Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 419 U.S. 522, 530
(1975)).
238. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 538; see Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 173 (1986) ("We
have never invoked the fair cross section principle.., to require petit juries, as opposed to
jury panels or venires, to reflect the composition of the community at large.").
239. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 538.
240. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S.
482, 495 (1977); Aldrich v. State, 928 S.W.2d 558, 560 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) ("We accept
that Hispanics are a distinctive group in any community .....
241. Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 174.
242. Id. at 174-75 (quoting Taylor, 419 U.S. at 530-31).
243. 823 S.W.2d 371, 373 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, writ. ref'd) (citing United States ex
rel. Silagy v. Peters, 713 F. Supp. 1246, 1251 (C.D. Ill. 1989)); United States v. Blair, 493 F.
Supp. 398, 406 (D. Md. 1980), affd, 665 F.2d 500 (4th Cir. 1981).
244. Duren, 439 U.S. at 364.
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evidence to show an absolute disparity245 of more than 10%.246 The rep-
resentation of the distinct group is measured against the community of
eligible jurors, rather than the whole community.247 An absolute dispar-
ity is calculated by subtracting the percentage of the jury venire that is
composed of members of the distinct group from the percentage of the
community of eligible jurors made up of members of the distinct
group.248 The Supreme Court has not determined precisely the point at
which the representation of a distinctive group is so low as to be unfair
and unreasonable. 249 However, a showing of an absolute disparity
greater than 10% should be sufficient to satisfy the second element of the
Duren test.250
Here, the absolute disparity exceeds 10% by a substantial margin.
Based on the analysis of Dr. Hietala, the absolute disparity in the Rayford
case-making all assumptions in favor of the state-is a minimum of
15.18%.251 As explained in his affidavit, Hispanics make up approxi-
mately 26.37% of persons eligible for jury service.252 Because this num-
ber is drawn from year-2000 figures, Dr. Hietala suggests that this
number could be somewhat higher due to dramatic Hispanic growth in
Dallas over the last four years. 253 In comparison, based on Dr. Hietala's
analysis of Rayford's 683 person panel, only sixty-six prospective jurors
members could possibly have been considered Hispanic (9.66%).254
Also, Rayford's petit jury contained no Hispanics.255 Thus, based on the
evidence, Professor Hietala concluded that Hispanics were under-
represented on Rayford's venire panel, that the absolute disparity was
245. United States v. Maskeny, 609 F.2d 183, 190 (5th Cir. 1980).
246. United States v. Haley, 521 F. Supp. 290, 292 (N.D. Ga. 1981) ("[C]ourts have
clearly arrived at the conclusion that more than 10% absolute disparity is necessary to
implicate a violation of the fair cross section rule.") (citing Swain v. Alabama, 380 U. S.
202, 208-09 (1965)); United States v. Butler, 611 F.2d 1066, 1070 (5th Cir. 1980); Maskeny,
609 F.2d at 190; Thompson v. Sheppard, 490 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1974); see also Eades, supra
note 65, at 1823 (saying that most courts use the 10% floor from Swain).
247. United States v. Williams, 264 F.3d 561, 568 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v. Brum-
mitt, 665 F.2d 521, 529 (5th Cir. 1981) ("[T]he disparity ... must be based not on total
population but, instead, on those of the identifiable class who are eligible to serve as ju-
rors."); Pondexter v. State, 942 S.W.2d 577, 580-81 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
248. Maskeny, 609 F.2d at 190.
249. The Supreme Court has never articulated precise standards for determining what
constitutes a significant under-representation. See Haley, 521 F. Supp. at 292 (citing Alex-
ander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 630 (1972)).
250. Maskeny, 609 F.2d at 190.
251. See Aff. of Harold Hietala, supra note 29. Dr. Hietala actually produced a range
of numbers account for certain assumptions. See id. The 15.18% number is the result of
those assumptions having been made in the State's favor (e.g., whether the number of
reporting Hispanics should be determined solely on the basis of self-identification, or
should include individuals who are Hispanic, but chose either not to identify themselves as
Hispanic or not to provide a racial information). Id. The maximum absolute disparity
calculated by Dr. Hietala was 17.54%. Id. Either number is substantially higher than the
necessary minimum of 10%. See Maskeny, 609 F.2d at 190.
252. Aff. of Harold Hietala, supra note 29, at 6.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 7-8.
255. An all-white jury tried Rayford. Even the alternative juror was white.
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well in excess of 10%, and that the possibility that mere random chance
created the disparity was less than one in 10,000,000.256
Although the disparity in Duren was shown to have existed for nearly a
year, the Supreme Court did not explicitly state a minimum period of
time over which a disparity must be shown. 257 However, courts in subse-
quent cases have required a showing of underrepresentation for a sub-
stantial period of time, though no court has ever stated exactly how much
time is really necessary.258 Dr. Hietala has analyzed Dallas County ve-
nire data dating back to March 2000, and the data shows a significant and
consistent underrepresentation of Hispanics over time.259 The absolute
disparities since 2000 have ranged from a minimum of 15.18% to a high
of 15.52%.260 Taking away the assumptions that favor the state increases
that range to 18.40% to 19.82%.261 In either case, the data shows that the
underrepresentation of Hispanics on the venire panel from which
Rayford's all-white jury was drawn was not the result of chance. On the
contrary, it is consistent with a larger pattern of underrepresentation of
Hispanics that, as shown below, is both inherent to and the systematic
result of the jury selection process employed in Dallas County.
E. STEP FIVE: THE UNDER-REPRESENTATION OF HISPANICS ON
VENIRES IN DALLAS COUNTY IS SYSTEMATIC
The third element of the Duren test requires that the disparity be the
result of systematic exclusion.262 In Dallas County, all of the evidence,
the analysis contained in related studies and other jurisdictions, and any
reasonable interpretation of the facts points to the systematic exclusion of
Hispanics. This is mostly because six dollars a day is so low-the lowest
in the nation-that the working poor cannot afford to attend jury duty.
This falls disproportionately on Hispanics who make up a large part of
the working poor in this county. Because this and other procedures in-
herent to Dallas County's venire selection are employed daily against
every defendant in Dallas County courts, the disparity is systematic under
Duren' s requirements.
1. Juror Pay Excludes Hispanics Disproportionately
In Texas, employers do not have to pay their employees for time spent
serving as a juror.263 Thus, jury duty often means losing a daily wage for
day laborers and hourly workers summoned for jury duty. In Dallas,
256. Id. at 7-10.
257. See generally Duren, 439 U.S. at 362-63.
258. See, e.g., Timmel v. Phillips, 799 F.2d 1083, 1086 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that the
long-term requirement applies to both the second and third prongs of the Duren test).
259. See Aff. of Harold Hietala, supra note 29.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Duren, 439 U.S. at 364.
263. Eades, supra note 65, at 1816; see also TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. Code Ann.
§ 122.001 (Vernon 2004).
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where six dollars a day is also the prevailing rate, studies have shown that
the poor, especially day laborers, many of which are Hispanics, fail to
show up for jury duty.264 Six dollars barely pays for parking at the court
building, which leaves jurors without any money to buy lunch. Thus, the
poorest citizens-to whom jury duty is a secondary concern to providing
food and shelter for their families-are forced to choose between a day's
wage, perhaps $45, or attending the courthouse. The evidence suggests
that people for which financial hardship is the primary factor in their non-
participation are disproportionately Hispanic. 265 Experience in other ju-
risdictions also suggests that raising the daily pay from six to forty dollars
would greatly increase participation by low wage earners and
Hispanics. 266
The problem is compounded because Dallas County systematically fails
to enforce juror summonses-this allows many poor Hispanics to simply
opt out of the system.267 As explained in Duren and Taylor, such an ar-
rangement is unconstitutional and unacceptable. 268 As the Supreme
Court reasoned in those cases, procedures allowing most women to opt
out of jury service violated the defendants' rights to a jury from a fair
cross section of the community.269
2. Update of Addresses
Hispanics are also disproportionately affected by the county's failure to
update its address lists. Dallas County gets its addresses from voter regis-
tration lists and driver's license and state ID card databases. However,
because addresses are often not updated until a person renews their
driver's license, many of the addresses become bad addresses when a per-
son changes residences. Studies reflect that huge numbers of jury sum-
monses are returned because of bad addresses. 270 The evidence also
shows that this disproportionately affects Hispanics because Hispanics
move more frequently than other groups.271 New York-whose driver's
licenses are updated every eight years (Texas licenses usually expire in
six)-resolved this very problem by subscribing to a national change of
address service. 272
In sum, all of the essential elements of Duren are met. Hispanics are a
distinctive group. They are being dramatically underrepresented on the
264. Eades, supra note 65, at 1813; Curriden, supra note 5, at Al.
265. Eades, supra note 65, at 1813.
266. See Mark Curriden, Extra Money Helps El Paso Lure More Prospective Jurors,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, October 24, 2000, at A8 [hereinafter "Curriden III"]; Mark Cur-
riden, No Excuses: New Yorkers Who Try to Avoid Jury Duty Find That System Has Gotten
Serious About Service, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, October 24, 2000, at Al [hereinafter
"Curriden II"].
267. See Aff. and Testimony of Donna Roach, supra note 84.
268. Duren, 439 U.S. at 357; Taylor, 419 U.S. at 522.
269. Duren, 439 U.S. at 375; Taylor, 419 U.S. at 522.
270. Curriden & Pusey, supra note 5, at Al.
271. Id.
272. Curriden II, supra note 266, at Al.
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venire panels and have been since at least March 2000. And the cause of
the underrepresentation is systematic. Therefore, Rayford has made a
prima-facie case that his Sixth Amendment right to a jury drawn from a
fair cross section of the community has been violated.
VI. REMEDIES ARE AVAILABLE
Identifying the problem is one thing. Finding solutions is quite another.
Fortunately, there are two excellent examples from which state and local
governments can learn. The State of New York and El Paso County,
Texas have separately and impressively attempted to reverse the negative
trend of declining public participation in jury service.2 73
A. NEW YORK: THE "CARROT AND STICK" APPROACH
The first jurisdiction to take a broad and systematic approach in tack-
ling low public participation was New York. The city and state that held
the torch of light so many years for immigrants now shines the way for
communities across the country to help the descendants of those immi-
grants serve a uniquely American obligation: jury service. New York
Court of Appeals Chief Judge Judith Kaye, the state's highest ranking
jurist, noticed in 1995 that New York City regularly faced a shortage of
jurors to conduct trials. 274 In 1995, only 12% of the people summoned to
jury duty in New York City showed up.275 Judge Kaye realized that low
citizen participation meant that it was increasingly likely that segments of
society were being underrepresented. 276
To fix the problem, Judge Kaye and the New York Legislature insti-
tuted a series of dramatic but amazingly commonsense reforms that more
than tripled the response rate in Manhattan and other parts of New York
City.277 Some of the reforms, such as increasing juror pay and paying for
transportation, cost a considerable amount of money.278 Other reforms
actually saved the state money.279 But implemented together, the success
was extraordinary. Just five years after the reforms were instituted, the
public participation rate of New York jurors jumped from 12% to
37%.280
The first step taken by New York court officials was to repeal all ex-
emptions from jury service. 281 Doctors, lawyers, dentists, podiatrists, em-
balmers and prostheticists had convinced the state legislature over the













had a successful lobby, the legislature would grant you an exemption,"
said Judge Kaye.283 This added nearly 1,000,000 names to the pool. 284 At
the same time, New York court officials expanded the lists from which
they summon jurors.285 Like most jurisdictions, New York identified po-
tential jurors from voter registration and driver's licenses databases.286
To reach more people, court officials added lists from New York State
income tax payers and state unemployment and welfare rolls.287 By do-
ing so, the state added more than 500,000 residents of New York State to
their jury pool.288
The second step addressed the high rate of jury summonses being re-
turned to New York court officials as undeliverable by the U.S. Postal
Service. 289 The fact that New York is a very mobile society and that the
state updated its driver's license address lists only every eight years meant
that large segments of the community had moved or died.290 New York
officials hired a national-change-of-address service to update the mailing
addresses of its prospective jurors.291 Court officials estimate that they
have added thousands of people back onto the juror rolls and saved the
state about $100,000 annually by not mailing out undeliverable
summonses.
292
New York increased the money it pays to jurors from ten dollars a day
to forty dollars a day.2 93 The increased amount raised the cost of juror
pay from $7,000,000 to $24,000,000.294 But state court officials report that
the percentage of hourly wage earners publicly participating in the jury
process rose significantly. 295 At the same time, New York officials re-
quired companies with at least twenty employees to pay their workers
that are called to jury service.296 Judge Kaye also created a juror compli-
ance court to enforce public participation in the jury system. 297 Judge
Kaye, like other judges around the country, disfavored the idea of send-
ing sheriff's deputies or court marshals out to round up no-shows to force
them to serve on juries.298 Such a process is not only time consuming and
expensive, but it also produces angry jurors-and no one wants an angry
juror deciding their case.299
283. See Improving Our Jury System, New York Unified Court System (1997).
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Instead, Judge Kaye and her staff designed a system in which jurors are
sent friendlier, more informational notifications to jury service.3°° If the
citizen does not respond, then a follow-up reminder is sent six weeks
later.30 1 If there is still no response, New York court officials mail a
warning letter stating that the resident may be found in contempt if they
continue to ignore their responsibility as New York citizens to participate
in the jury system.302 A few weeks later, a show-cause order is delivered,
finding the individual in contempt and notifying them that the State of
New York has placed a lien against their property. 303 The lien effectively
ends the individual's ability to obtain credit.304 "It gets their attention,"
says Judge Kaye. 30 5 To remove the lien, citizens must appear before a
specially designated state-trial judge to explain why they did not respond
to their jury summons.306 For example, the special "jury compliance
court" in Manhattan is in session once a week and handles an estimated
thirty to sixty cases a week of individuals who failed to respond. 30 7 "The
goal isn't to punish people but to get people to understand the impor-
tance of jury service and to serve," says Judge Stella Schindler. "We
don't want people to walk away from here angry. It's a civics lesson. 30 8
Residents who simply admit they ignored their summonses get a minimal
fine of twenty-five dollars or So.309 The cases are immediately dismissed
for those with legitimate excuses.310 But individuals who try to talk their
way out of it often face stiffer fines of up to $1,000. 31 1 The penalty for
one habitually delinquent juror, who happened to be an opera singer, was
to perform for the more conscientious citizens who had voluntarily ful-
filled their civic duty that day.312 New York-court officials report that the
compliance court generates an estimated $50,000 in fines for the state
annually.313
Finally, New York-court officials made jury service more appetizing.
Candidates may postpone their jury service for up to six months if their
work schedules are too busy or if they have a vacation planned. 314 Single
parents may have their appearances delayed for up to two years.315
Court officials have added desks in juror waiting rooms that have electric




















an independent ombudsman to represent juror interests in any dis-
putes.317 And finally, court officials in Manhattan reward jurors who
have served with an end-of-the-year juror-appreciation reception.318 Be-
yond the cake, chips and punch, jurors also get to meet celebrity jurors
who served that year, such as Woody Allen, Kevin Bacon, James Earl
Jones and Tom Brokaw.319 Which of the reforms were truly at the heart
of New York's jury-participation turnaround is not clear.
B. EL PASO-THE "CARROT-ONLY" APPROACH
Nearly 2,000 miles southwest of New York, El Paso, Texas court offi-
cials faced their own problem with decreasing public participation in the
jury system in the late 1990s. 320 Only 22% of people summoned to jury
duty were showing up.32 1 At the time, El Paso officials paid jurors six
dollars aday-the minimum payment required under Texas law.3 22 In
1999, El Paso residents voted to increase juror pay to forty dollars a
day.323 The result was astounding: public participation jumped from 22%
to 46% within a year.324 By 2002, the jury-show-up rate had climbed to
nearly 60%.325
What was the cost to the average taxpayer? $1.75 a year. 326
C. OTHER PROPOSED LEGISLATION, INCLUDING THE JURY
PATRIOTISM ACT
There are several options regarding raising juror pay. One possibility is
that states could pay nothing the first day, using those funds to pay jurors
a reasonable wage starting on the second day of service. Second, states
could exempt jurors whose employers pay their workers who serve on
jury duty, allowing the courts to pay more to jurors who are not being
paid by their employers. Third, states could provide tax incentives or
credits to employers who pay their workers while serving on jury duty.
Eight states, as of 2004, have passed the Jury Patriotism Act.327 The
act imposes a surcharge on all civil-court filings. 328 The money from the
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VII. CONCLUSION
The problem of declining public participation in the American jury sys-
tem is worsening. The evidence indicates that a disproportionately
smaller percentage of the Hispanic, young adult, and low-income popula-
tions in our communities is not participating in the American jury system.
So significant is the problem that it is clear that the constitutional chal-
lenges are starting and will only increase in the near future. Thousands,
possibly tens-of-thousands, of criminal convictions may be subject to
challenges.
"How can we say our justice system is working when we see one class
of people-older, white, upper-middle-class citizens-always sitting in
judgment of other classes of people?" says Neil Vidmar, a law professor
at Duke University and an expert on jury studies. 330
Yet, outside of New York and El Paso, very little has been done to
attempt to address this growing problem of constitutional importance.
Jurors have no ability to lobby legislatures to force change. Lawyer
groups have their own agendas. The defense bar is concerned that ex-
panding the jury pool to include more Hispanics, young adults, and low-
income individuals will make jurors more sympathetic to plaintiffs-even
though no evidence supports this position. And the plaintiff's bar contin-
ues to push for six-member juries, even though the reduction leads to less
demographic diversity in the venire and on the juries themselves.
So, one question remains: Who will address the matter first? Will it be
the courts that have the obligation to guarantee citizens the right to a fair
trial by an impartial jury that is selected from a representative cross sec-
tion of the community? Or will it be state legislatures and county govern-
ments that have the power to modify the jury process? On the eve of the
publication of this article the Texas Legislature passed and the governor
signed into law Senate Bill 1704, which will increase the compensation
the state pays to jurors from six dollars a day to forty dollars starting the
juror's second day of service. The jury pay increase, which goes into ef-
fect January 1, 2006 (Amended Texas Government Code Section 61.001),
is a first and significant step toward fixing the problem.331
Public confidence in the American justice system and the individual's
right to a fair trial, free from impartial jurors, may be compromised if this
issue goes unaddressed. Broader participation in the jury system will pro-
mote needed confidence in and enhance the moral authority of the justice
system. Taking steps to increase participation in the justice system to en-
sure selection of juries from truly representative cross sections of the
community will enhance the fact-finding process and improve the func-
tion of perhaps the most truly democratic of American institutions.
330. See Curriden & Pusey, supra note 5, at Al.
331. Authors Michael Martin and Mark Curriden drafted the proposed Senate Bill 1704
and testified before the Texas Senate Jurisprudence Committee in favor of the legislation.
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